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The American Administrative State: The New
Leviathan
A. M. Gulas*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In virtually every relevant respect, the administrative process has become a
fourth branch of government, comparable in the scope of its authority and
the impact of its decision making to the three more familiar constitutional
branches.'

Taking into account the vast resources at the disposal of administrative agencies, to have so much rulemaking and adjudicative
power in the hands of a group unaccountable to the electorate, creates what one commentator has referred to as a "crisis. ' '2 What can
justify, or legitimate, the exercise of such sweeping powers by the
offspring of a government, composed of co-equal branches, dedicated to the philosophy of a separation of powers? Or, to put it
succinctly, how do you control a leviathan? 3
The purpose of this article is to give an introduction to the modern administrative process and its powers, its quest for legitimacy
within a cautious society, and a description of methods used to-if
not control-at least contain its rambling existence. Out of necessity, discussion will be limited to the federal sphere although the
questions raised are applicable to state administrative agencies as
well.

II.
A.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

Historical Roots
The American Revolution was fought for more than freedom

* B.A. 1975 University of Pittsburgh, J.D. 1988, Duquesne Law School, Judicial Clerk
for the Honorable Carol Los Mansmann, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 1988-1990.
1. J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY, 6 (1978).
2. Id. at 7.
3. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, (1970). "For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN
called a COMMON-WEALTH or STATE.... WHICH IS BUT AN Artificial Man; though
of great stature and strength than the Naturall, for whose protection and defence it was
intended..."Id. at xiii.
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from colonial rule. The independence sought was as much a philosophical independence as it was political independence. The newly
formed country was innocent, seemingly naive in the eyes of governments established centuries earlier. Yet, it was a country determined that it would acquiesce only to the acts of a legitimate government created by the people. The first three words of the
Preamble to the Constitution were more than an introductory
phrase, the meaning in that day and age was resounding: WE THE
PEOPLE . . . was the expression of the Framers' belief that the
federal government must be the legitimate sovereign entity created
by the people, made of the people, to work for the people. Furthermore, and contrary to the earlier theory expounded by Thomas
Hobbes, the sovereign was subject to the law."
The philosophy behind the notion of a government of the people
can be traced to John Locke and The Second Treatise of Government. 5 The United States Constitution, however, is more Madison
and Montesquieu. James Madison explained the need for a government based on co-equal branches, now known as the theory of separation of powers, in The Federalist: "The accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,
whether of one, of few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition
of tyranny.""
The revolutionary war, won at the cost of numerous lives, would
amount to a hollow victory if the government replacing the English
rule was equally unresponsive to the needs of the people. To avoid
that very chilling possibility, the Framers of the Constitution divided the essential governmental functions into three co-equal
branches to prevent any one branch from accumulating too much
power. "The very structure of the articles delegating and separating powers under Articles I, II and III exemplify the concept of
'7
separation of powers."
4. Id. Hobbes felt one of the things which tends to weaken or dissolve the Commonwealth was the notion "That he that hath the Soveraign Power, is subject to the Civill
Lawes." Id., at 233.
5. Compare Hobbes, supra note 4 with Locke; "And so whoever has the legislative or
supreme power of any commonwealth is bound to govern by established standing laws,

promulgated and known to the people ....
MENT,

J. LOCKE, THE

SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERN-

73 (1950).

6. MADISON, THE FEDERALIST, No. 47 ().
7. Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 946 (1983). Chada
involved § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act which authorized either House
of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the Attorney General to permit an
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Obviously, the administrative agencies, with their combined investigative, adjudicative and legislative powers do not conform
with the ideal advanced by political theorists. In fact, the criticism
leveled at the administrative process as being at variance with the
notion of separation of powers is perhaps the main stumbling block
to its acceptance as a legitimate government entity." One might
wonder if theorists tried to out-do Madison by requiring a strict
adherence to that theory, since Madison viewed the doctrine as a
precaution against a concentration of power but not as a preclusion
of one branch participating with another in the process of government.' "The key principle is a system of checks and balances-not
a watertight separation between the three branches."' 10
B. Separation of Powers and Delegation
Simply stated, the separation of powers doctrine forbids one
branch of government from performing the acts of another. Matters of necessity make it impossible to strictly adhere to that theory. The nondelegation doctrine, which is borrowed from the common law of agency and forbids subdelegation," is also difficult to
strictly enforce.
Conceivably, since the people of the United States have delegated their power to the federal government and embodied the
limits of delegated power within the Constitution, this is very similar to the principal-agent relationship where the contract defines
the scope of the agency. Agency law forbids the delegation of the
agent's power to a subagent without authorization by the principal." By analogy, when Congress transfers law-making power to
the executive branch and permits the executive to legislate standards and codes applicable to national industry, there is an unconstitutional delegation of power by the legislature.' s As can be seen,
alien, who could otherwise be deported, to remain in the United States. The Court held,
inter alia that the one-house veto was violative of the constitutional doctrine of separation
of powers. Id.
8. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 109, 64 (1959).
9. J. FREEDMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, 18-19.
10. B. Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1983, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 92 (1984).
Furthermore: "The only absolute separation that has ever been possible was that in the
theoretical writings of a Montesquieu, who looked across a foggy England from his sunny
Gascon vineyards, and completely misconstrued what he saw." Id.
11. R. LORCH, DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 79 (1980).
12. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 18 ( ).
13. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). See also Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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a violation of the doctrine against delegation can result in the violation of the theory of separation of powers as well.
Although the first time the United States Supreme Court held
there had been an unlawful delegation of legislative power did not
occur until 1935, it was riot the first time an administrative action
was challenged as an unlawful delegation of power. As early as
1813,1 the Court upheld an act of Congress which provided that
certain sections of a previous act would be revived upon the determination by the President that a named contingency had occurred.'" While the "contingency" theory was a valid explanation
for presidential actions, the Court needed another theory to uphold the transfer of power when Congress authorized the Secretary
of Agriculture to make such rules and regulations as he deemed
necessary to provide for the protection and use of the national forests.'" A unanimous Court held that the Secretary of Agriculture
In Schechter the Supreme Court held § 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional, because the Court found that the "codes of fair competition" would allow the
President to impose his own conditions on the regulated industries resulting in a sweeping
delegation of legislative power to the executive branch. The Court reasoned that the NIRA
supplied no standards for any trade, industry, or activity nor did the statute provide any
standards for the president to follow in implementing the codes. Consequently, the Court
found § 3 violative of the doctrine against delegation implicit in the constitution. 295 U.S. at
541-42.
Similarly, in Panama Refining Co., the Court held § 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) unconstitutional. 293 U.S. at 430. Section 9(c) authorized the president
to prohibit the transportation of petroleum in interstate commerce in excess of the amount
permitted by state law. The violation of the regulations could result in fines or imprisonment not to exceed six months. The Court concluded that in the absence of Congress setting
a standard for the executive to follow, § 9(c) resulted in Congress abdicating its essential
legislative function to the executive. 293 U.S. at 406.
14. The Brig Aurora, 7 Cranch 382 (1813). The contingency was a determination by
President Madison that Great Britain and France had ceased violating the neutral commerce of the United States. [Author's note: Had THE BRIG AURORA been decided after
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), one wonders if Chief Justice Marshall would have invoked the "necessary and proper" clause and ended the ongoing controversy before it started. Perhaps not, since Congress was not exercising the power itself to
implement what was "necessary and proper," but was delegating the power to another to
make the decision. The delegation of such sweeping power would have flown in the face of
the Constitution itself.]
15. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). Congress had passed the Act of October 1,
1890, 26 Stat. 567, with a view to secure reciprocal trade with countries producing certain
named articles. Whenever the President was satisfied that a particular country producing a
named good imposed duties "reciprocally unequal and unreasonable" upon the agricultural
or other products of the United States, the President could suspend the free introduction of
the foreign products and levy duties on the imported products. Id. 692-93.
16. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911). See also Buttfield v. Stranahan,
192 U.S. 470 (1904).
In Grimaud, the Court upheld the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Agricul-
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was not legislating but was exercising the power to "fill up the details" of the legislation Congress had enacted to regulate the occupancy and use of the forests and preserve them from destruction."7
The theory was that Congress had already determined a "primary
standard""' and left it to the Secretary to administer the policy.19
In 1935, when the Supreme Court invalidated Title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act declaring it to be an improper delegation of legislative power to the President, it was because Congress had failed to establish an "intelligible principle" for the
20
executive to follow.
After 1935, the Court continued to uphold Congressional grants
of power to agencies either by narrowly construing the legislation
to meet constitutional requirements," or by finding standards in
previous agency action. 2 The nondelegation doctrine became so
ture regarding the use of forest reservations for grazing purposes. 220 U.S. at 522.
In Buttfield, the Court determined that the regulations implemented by the Secretary of
Treasury pursuant to the "Tea Inspection Act of 1897", 29 Stat. 604, were valid since Congress can, without violating the due process clause, establish standards for the importation
of food articles. 192 U.S. at 492-97.
17. Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 517.
18. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1924). Congress enacted a
flexible tariff authorizing the imposition of custom duties on imported articles equaling the
difference between the cost of producing them in a foreign country and of selling them here
and the cost of producing like or similar articles and selling them in the United States. The
Tariff Commission was to investigate and determine the differences and report to the President who increased or decreased duties accordingly. The Court upheld the Act since Congress had laid down an "intelligible principle" for the President to follow. Id. at 411-13.
19. Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 523.
20. See Schechter, supra note 13. Schechter was decided on two grounds; the one
mentioned (delegation) and also for the improper regulation of intrastate commerce. 295
U.S. at 529-51. See also PanamaRefinery, supra note 13. In Panama Refinery, Justice Cardozo's dissent found an "intelligible principle" in section 1 of the legislation, wherein Congress identified the purpose of the statute. 293 U.S. at 435.
21. National Cable Television Assn. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974) and its companion case Federal Power Commission v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345 (1974). In
National Cable, the Court upheld the Federal Communication Commission's practice of
charging a fee for costs to the FCC for CATV regulations to community antenna television
(CATV) based on the "value to the recipient." The Court remanded the case to the FCC to
eliminate that portion of the fee which could be considered the cost of the FCC supervision
unit which benefited the public. Thus, the Court narrowly defined the term "value to the
recipient" to mean the CATV and not the public. Id. at 342-43.
In FPC v. New England Power, the Court upheld the FPC's impostion of a fee on electric
utilities but limited the fee to "each identifiable recipient for a measurable unit or amount
of Government service or property from which he derives a special benefit," in other words,
"only specific charges for specific services to specific individuals or companies." Id. at 345.
22. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947). In Fahey, the Court concluded that the
rules and regulations of the Home Loan Bank Board governing the appointment of conservators were sufficiently explicit, when considered with the conventional regulations found in
state and federal banking statutes and against the background of custom, "to be adequate
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out of use that it was described as being "as moribund as the substantive due process approach of the same era [1930's]. ' '23 The doctrine has been continuously raised and just as consistently ignored
24
by the Court "almost since the day [Schechter] was decided.
In the early 1980's opinions written by Justice (now Chief Justice) Rehnquist revived the nondelegation doctrine in its purist
form.23 Industrial Union v. American Petroleum Institute6 involved a guideline enacted in section 6(b)(5) of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA) which allowed the Secretary of Labor to enact health standards which would "to the extent
for proper administration and for judicial review if there should be a proper occasion for it."
332 U.S. at 253.
23. National Cable Television Ass'n, 415 U.S. at 353 (J. Marshall, dissenting).
24. Id. at 354. Justice Marshall continued, citing 1 K DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE, §2.01 (1958). "Lawyers who try to win cases by arguing that Congressional delegations are unconstitutional almost invariably do more harm than good to their client's interests .... In absence of palpable abuse or true Congressional abdication, the nondelegation
doctrine to which the Supreme Court has in the past offered lip service is without practical
force." Id. at 353 n. 1.
But see Pork Motel Corp. v. Kansas Dep't of Health & Env't, 234 Kan. 374, 673 P.2d 1126
(1983), Gold Kist Inc. v. Dept. of Agriculture, 741 F.2d 344 (11th Cir. 1984), Subcontractors
v. Koch, 62 N.Y.2d 422, 477 N.Y.S.2d 120 (1984), Louisiana v. Broom, 439 So.2d 357 (La.
1983) all showing that the nondelegation doctrine is very much alive in certain states. This
is especially so when the legislature delegate the power to create felonies, Broom, supra.
25. See Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) and
American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) [also known as the "Cotton
Dust" Case].
Industrial Union involved a standard promulgated by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 which permits the Secretary to issue satandards to insure the safe and healthful working conditions of the country's workforce.
After determining that there was a causal connection between benzene and leukemia, the
Secretary issued a standard reducing the permissible exposure level of airborne concentrations of benzene from 10 parts per million (ppm) to 1 ppm, and prohibitting skin contact
with solutions containing benzene. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the standard invalid because it was based on findings not supported by the record.
A plurality of the Court concluded that the Secretary had to make a threshold finding
that the place of employment was unsafe before promulgating any permanent health or
safety standards. They reasoned that the Secretary's imposition of a burden on the industry
without making the threshold detemination of an unsafe condition was an improper use of
his power. 448 U.S at 653-59.
American Textile also involved the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. Pursuant to § 6(b)(5) of the Act, the Secretary of Labor is required to promulgate occupational
safety and health standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful agents "which most
adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence" that
no employee will suffer material impairment of health. The Secretary promulgated the "cotton dust" standard for the textile industry limiting occupational exposure to cotton dust in
order to control the serious and potentially disabling lung disease byssinosis or "brown
lung". 452 U.S. at 503.
26. 448 U.S. 607 (1980), see supra note 25.
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feasible" assure no employee would suffer impairment of health."
In his concurring opinion Justice Rehnquist noted " 'to the extent
feasible' render[ed] what had been a clear, if somewhat unrealistic,
standard largely, if not entirely, precatory" so as to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the Executive
branch.2" The majority of the Court in the 5-4 decision which invalidated the Secretary's standard for permissible exposure levels
to benzene was unable to agree on an opinion. 9 Three Justices expressed the view that the Secretary had failed to adequately support the guidelines with findings of fact.30 Justice Powell concurred, but carried the analysis one step further to require the
Secretary to perform a cost-benefit analysis." Justice Rehnquist's
nondelegation approach provided the tiebreaking vote. In contrast,
the dissent was solidly of the opinion that the Secretary had complied with the statute and his decision was supported by "substan32
tial evidence.
A year later in the "Cotton Dust" Case,3 3 Justice Rehnquist was
joined in his dissent by Chief Justice Burger as he reiterated his
warning of the previous year that "to the extent feasible" resulted
in a bald delegation of legislative power to the executive branch. "'
This had resulted from the failure of Congress to agree on the extent to which the "Secretary should be authorized to create a riskfree work environment;" therefore, the language is "no more than
an admonition to the Secretary to do his duty," and provides "no
meaningful guidance to those who will administer the law."3 5
In essence, Justice Rehnquist's concern is as follows. The judicial
27. Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 612 (emphasis in original).
28. Id. at 681-82.
29. See generally Id. at 611-88.
30. 448 U.S. at 659-62.
31. Id. at 665-71.
32. Id. at 705-06. See Universal Camera Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 340 U.S.
474 (1951) which explains the substantial evidence test as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion when looking on the record
as a whole.
33. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981). This case involved
the determination of the validity of industry standards promulgated by the Secretary of
Labor under OSHA which regulated the permissible exposure levels to cotton dust. Id. at
495. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
34. 452 U.S. at 548.
35. 452 U.S. at 546. Justice Rehnquist further explained his position in a footnote,
that, "I do not argue that the existence of several plausible interpretations of the statute is a
ground for invoking the delegation doctrine: I invoke the delegation doctrine because Congress failed to choose among those plausible interpretations." 452 U.S. at 548, n. (Emphasis
in original.)
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juggling performed by the majority which ultimately resulted in
the rejection of petitioner's argument that section 6(b)(5) required
a cost-benefit analysis was unnecessary. Had Congress defined
what it meant by the phrase "to the extent feasible," the search for
a definition would not have fallen upon, first the Secretary of Labor, and finally nine non-elected judges. The standard should have
been delineated in the statute. If Congress desires the Secretary to
use a cost-benefit analysis in determining permissible exposure
levels, it should state so in the statute; if not, it should state that
as well, and avoid the resort by the Court to the legislative history
of the statute to deduce the legislative intent. The fear is that a
"bald delegation" of power allows too much discretion on the part
of the administering agency, a subject discussed further in Part IV
of this article.
C.

The Not So Separate Powers of Agencies
The administrative process has developed in spite of the dominant theoretical thinking, not in response to it. 6

Understandably, individuals entrusted with the duty to resolve
problems are more concerned with finding immediate and practical
answers to those problems. They are not concerned with philosophical arguments as to why they cannot do what needs to be
done.
Agencies can be divided into two basic types: regulatory, which
have the authority to regulate the economic activities of individuals and businesses; and benefactory, which have the authority to
provide benefits to promote social and economic welfare. Examples
of regulatory agencies include: the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Examples of benefactory agencies include the Social Security Administration, and state
and federal public assistance agencies. 7
The blending of powers which exists in the administrative process is a reflection of the blending found in the three traditional
branches. The following discussion describes the major powers exercised by modern independent administrative agencies.
36.

1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 2.1, 59-60. (2d ed. 1978).
GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 16-18 (1979).

37. W.
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1. Investigative (Subpoenas & Inspections)

Prior to the 1940's, the Constitution, specifically the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments, provided virtual blanket protection from unnecessary federal governmental investigation.3 8 In 1908, Justice
Holmes voiced the attitude of the times in Harrimanv. ICC,3 9 "the
power to require testimony is limited . . . to . . .cases . . . where
investigations concern a specific breach of the law."' 0 Consequently, the Interstate Commerce Commission could not use subpoenas in investigations undertaken to determine regulatory policy."1 Later, Justice Holmes similarly refused to allow the Federal
Trade Commission to go on a "fishing expedition" in FTC v.
American Tobacco Company.'2 Holmes adamantly argued, "[i]t is
contrary to the first principles of justice to allow a search through
all the respondent's records, relevant or irrelevant, in the hope that
something will turn up."''
The Supreme Court reversed its policy in 1943 when it permitted the issuance of subpoenas for payroll records by the Secretary
of Labor pursuant to the Walsh-Healey Act." As the evidence
sought by the Secretary was neither "incompetent or irrelevant" to
38. Compare Harriman v. I.C.C., 211 U.S. 407 (1908) with Endicott-Johnson Corp v.
Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 91943). See infra notes 39 and 41 and accompanying text.
39. 211 U.S. 407 (1908). In November, 1906, the ICC, on its own motion and not upon
a complaint, began an investigation to determine whether certain combinations and practices engaged in by railroads were defeating the purposes of the Commission. Harriman was
a director and Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Union Pacific Railroad. He was
called as a witness by the Commission which was investigating the relations between Union
Pacific and other connecting railroads. During the inquiry, the Commission asked Harriman
several questions with regard to the amount of stock Union Pacific owned in other railroads.
At the advice of counsel, Harriman declined to answer. The Commission directed him to
respond and he refused. The Circuit Court directed him to answer and he appealed. The
Supreme Court reversed, and further stated that "the purposes of the act for which the
commission may exact evidence embrace only complaints for violations of the act, and investigations by the commission upon matters that might have been made the object of a
complaint." 211 U.S. at 419.
40. 211 U.S. at 419-20.
41. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 41 (2d ed. 1978).
42. 264 U.S. 298 (1924). The FTC brought petitions for writs of mandamus in the
district court against the manufacturers and sellers of tobacco requiring the production of
records, contracts and correspondence for inspection and examination. The FTC was investigating the possibility of unfair competition through price fixing. The district court denied
the issuance of the writs and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court stated that "a general
subpoena in the form of these petitions would be bad. Some evidence of the materiality of
the papers demanded must be produced." 264 U.S. at 306.
43. American Tobacco, 264 U.S. at 305-06.
44. Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, 41 U.S.C.A. § 35-45 (West 1987). See also
Endicott-Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943). The Act provided that government
contracts would not be granted to corporations in violation of the minimum wage standards.
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the duties entrusted to the Secretary, the district court was ordered to enforce the subpoena for production of the information."'
A similar situation existed in 1946 when the Court upheld the issuance of a subpoena under the Fair Labor Standards Act."6 Justice
Rutledge's opinion overruled many pre-1943 holdings, and more
specifically American Tobacco, with this language: "The very purpose of the subpoena . . . is to discover and procure evidence, not
to prove a pending charge or complaint, but upon which to make
one if, in the Administrator's judgment, the facts thus discovered
should justify doing so. '47
It should be noted, however, that the change in the Court's attitude toward subpoenas was not totally the result of a change in the
Court's philosophy. Congress had made its intent abundantly clear
by including language in the statutes which granted the agency administrator the power to investigate and subpoena. Thus, Congress
was becoming more refined in the direction it was giving the
agencies.
The strengthening of the administrative hand continued in the
1970's as the courts wrestled to balance the need of the government to conduct investigations in order to make informed policy
decisions with the need to protect the private individual from unreasonable searches and self-incrimination. "8 In 1967, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reasoned that the power of agencies
to issue investigative subpoenas depends upon congressional authorization in the enabling statute.4 9 This is in accord with other
courts of appeal which have concluded that the burden of proving
a subpoena is unreasonably placed on the challenger."
45. 317 U.S. at 509.
46. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946). Section 11(a) of
the Fair Labor Standards Act authorized the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division
of the Department of Labor to investigate practices and conditions in any industry covered
by the Act. The Act incorporated § 9 of the Federal Trade Commission Act which authorized the issuance and judicial enforcement of a subpoena decus tecum requesting the production of records, books and papers during an investigation of a violation of the Act. The
Court reasoned that the Administrator's function in enforcing the Act was similar to that of
a grand jury. 327 U.S. at 216.
47. 327 U.S. at 201.
48. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 109, 232-33 (1959).
49. Serr v. Sullivan, 270 F. Supp. 544 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd 390 F.2d 619 (3d Cir.
1967). See also Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408 (1984) which affirms the
Oklahoma Press holding. "[Tihe defenses available to an employer do not include the right
to insist upon a judicial warrant as a condition precedent to a valid administrative subpoena." Id. at 414-15.
50. FTC v. Rockefeller, 591 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1979); Small Business Admin. v. Barron,
240 F. Supp. 434 (W.D.S.C. 1965) (challenger has burden of proving that the subpoenas
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Generally, government agencies engaged in the inspection of private commercial enterprises must have a showing of probable
cause to satisfy Fourth Amendment requirements." There are several exceptions to this rule, notably those industries with a long
history of close regulation such as liquor and firearms. 52 For those
businesses still protected by the Fourth Amendment Warrant
Clause, the Court's language in Marshall v. Barlow's Inc.,53 that
traditional probable cause was not required in certain administrative searches, 54 is very important. According to the Court, in administrative matters, what is necessary is a showing that reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an
investigation are satisfied. 5
In 1981, the Supreme Court added mining industries to the list
of comprehensively regulated industries after concluding there was
a substantial federal interest in the improvement of mining conditions which was evidenced by the specific standards outlined in
56
section 103(a) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act.
requiring him to produce books and records of the corporation were unduly broad or oppressive). In FTC v. Rockefeller, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a showing by the FTC that an ancillary investigation was necessary to aid the principal investigation was sufficient to meet the statutory requirement of 15 U.S.C. § 49 for issuance of
subpoenas to several bank holding companies. 591 F.2d at 191.
51. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), and Colonnade Catering Corp.
v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., the owner of a electrical and plumbing installation petitioned for injunctive relief from a warrantless investigation by the agent of the Department
of Labor pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). The Court reasoned
that the exceptions to the warrant clause requirement of the fourth amendment were limited to those closely regulated industries with a long history of close supervision and inspection which had no reasonable expectation of privacy. Consequently, in any other commercial
building, just as with a private home, the warrant clause of the fourth amendment provides
protection from warrantless searches.
Colonnade involved one of the closely regulated industry; that of liquor. In Colonnade,
the Court concluded that the general rule requiring a warrant to search commercial premises is not applicable to inspections under liquor laws. The statute does not, however, authorize warrantless searches, but rather, makes it an offense to refuse to admit the
inspector.
52. Id.
53. 436 U.S. 307 (1978). See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
54. 436 U.S. at 320.
55. 436 U.S. at 320.
56. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981). The Court held that warrantless inspections pursuant to § 103(a) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95164, 91 Stat. 1290, 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1976) were reasonable within the meaning of the
fourth amendment. The Court reasoned that since the mine owners were aware that regular
inspections would be made, nothing would be gained by the additional requirement of a
warrant since the discretion and arbitrariness which agency officials could exercise in determining which mines to inspect and which would be curtailed by the regulatory scheme. In
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Regulatory (Rulemaking)

The regulatory powers exercised by agencies such as the ICC fall
into three categories: licensing power, by which the agency can
control entry into a given economic activity; rate-making power,
which is the authority to fix the rates charged by companies subject to its jurisdiction; and power over business practices, with
which the agency can approve or prohibit practices engaged in by
the industry.6 7
Time and again federal courts have upheld the power of agencies
to promulgate substantive rules when the statutory language
grants the administrator the power to "publish and promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
' Since such rules often have
purposes and provisions of this Act."58
the force of law on those regulated, 59 concern naturally exists that
those regulated be permitted to have a voice in the policy determination. Despite the existence of the Administrative Procedure
Act 0 which specifies the procedures to be followed by agencies,
federal courts for many years would engraft their own notions of
procedural requirements upon agencies. The Supreme Court put a
stop to this in 1978 with its decision in the Vermont Yankee
case. 1 Justice Rehnquist, penning the opinion for a unanimous
(seven Justice) court, stated: "Absent constitutional constraints or
compelling circumstances the administrative agencies should be
free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods
of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their . . . duaddition, the regulations clearly state what standards must be met. 452 U.S. at 605.
"The statute provides that federal mine inspectors are to inspect underground mines at
least four times per year and surface mines at least twice a year to insure compliance with
these standards." Donovan, 452 U.S. at 596.
57. W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 16-17 (1979).
58. In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 653 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir.
1981). The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that pursuant to the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-87, 91 Stat. 447, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq.,
the Secretary of the Interior had the "rulemaking power to prescribe minimum information
requirements for permit applications submitted to state regulatory agencies." 653 F.2d at
516.
59. For cases holding that agency rules have the force of law, see J.G. Masonry, Inc. v.
Dep't of Revenue, 680 P.2d 291 (Kan. 1984); Reed v. Hansbarger, 314 S.E. 2d 616 (W. Va.
1984); in re Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976 (Wyo. 1984).
60. Administrative Procedure Act, originally enacted June 11, 1946, c. 324, 60 Stat.
237, repealed and revised Pub. L. 89-554, 80 Stat. 381 (1966), codified at 5 U.S.C. § 551, et.
seq. (1982).
61. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519 (1978). The case involved the scope of judicial review with regard to the procedures followed by the Atomic Energy Commission's licensing of nuclear power plants.
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ties."' 62 Thus, 5 U.S.C. § 553 establishes the "maximum procedural
requirements which Congress was willing to have the courts impose
upon agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures. 6 3
3.

Adjudicatory

Essentially, the difference between rulemaking and adjudication
by an agency is the same as the difference between Congress and
the Supreme Court. Both make rules: Congressional rules are referred to as statutes, treaties, public laws, and resolutions while
judicial rules are known as principles or rules of law. Congressional
acts involve across the board line-drawing which act prospectively
and generally effect everyone. Judicial principles bind the parties
before the Court and in doing so set up a precedent so that people
similarly situated will be treated to the same general principle.
Usually, judicial decisions must have a retroactive effect to be
given weight."
The choice of proceeding with its statutorily imposed duties by
rulemaking (legislative power) or by adjudication is one left to the
agency. 5 As the Court explained in S.E.C. v. Chenery,6 6 problems
might arise which an agency could not foresee but which need to
be handled on an ad hoc basis;6 7 while if it determines that certain
standards must be promulgated in order to enforce the statute the
agency is entrusted with administering, then a general rule may be
in order.6 8 A rigid requirement that an agency proceed one way or
the other would make the administrative process too inflexible and
incapable of dealing with the myriad of specialized problems which
can arise.69 Agency action by adjudication acts on the parties
before the administrator. Yet, it can also have the force of law because it gives an indication of the policy now being enforced by the
62. 435 U.S. at 543.
63. 435 U.S. at 524.
64. But see S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). In Chenery, the Court noted
that the Commission's action in the present case was not prohibited by its failure to anticipate the problem and implement a general rule. To so hold would be to say the Commission
has no power to perform its statutory duty. 332 U.S. at 201-202.
65. S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947)(Commission's order prohibiting
purchase of company's stock while undergoing reorganization affirmed as complying with §§
7 and 11 of the Holding Company Act). See also NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759
(1969) (company ordered to supply list of employees to union for use in election must comply with valid Board order).
66. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
67. 332 U.S. at 202.
68. Id.
69. Chenery, 332 U.S. at 202-203.
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agency. One of the best examples of an agency directing policy
through adjudication is the National Labor Relations Board, which
enforces virtually all its regulatory policy through the adjudicatory
system." °
Agency adjudication on an informal basis, i.e., without a trial
type hearing, can be seen in the everyday workings of an agency.
For example, the grant or denial of benefits by the Social Security
Administration for a disability claim requires the administrator (or
a subordinate) to apply the given standards to the individual and
reach a determination. This is adjudication. Should the potential
recipient be denied, he has the right to appeal through the
agency's remedies. Generally, all remedies through the agency
must be exhausted before the individual can obtain judicial review
through the courts.7 1

III.

QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY

Institutional legitimacy is an indispensable condition for institutional effectiveness. . . . [Llegitimacy permits an institution to achieve its goals without the regular necessity of threatening the use of force and creating re7
newed episodes of public resentment. 1

Even the most legitimate of governments occasionally finds itself
70. See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Hearst Pub., Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). The
NLRB was entrusted with the task of enforcing the Wagner Act. In doing so, the Board
expanded the common law definition of employee. The Supreme Court upheld the Board's
definition, thereby overturning the court of appeals determination that Congress intended
the common law definition to apply. The Court noted:
It is not necessary in this case to make a completely definitive limitation around the
term 'employee.' That task has been assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to administer the Act. ... Every experience in the administration of the statute
gives it familiarity with the circumstances and background ...
322 U.S. at 130.
See also N.L.R.B. v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974), wherein the Court determined that the Board could, by adjudication, overrule a long line of cases and adopt a new
rule without resorting to rulemaking power.
71. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938). This is known as
the doctrine of exhaustion. Exceptions to the doctrine are: 1) the proceeding was unconstitutional or will cause harm to the plaintiff, (Rosenthal & Co. v. Bagley, 581 F.2d 1258, 1261
(7th Cir. 1978)) 2) agency action Was unauthorized, (Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188
(1958)) 3) conflict exists between federal jurisdiction and a state agency, (U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl. 2) 4) agency is deadlocked or exhaustion is futile, (4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE, § 26:11 (2d Ed. 1983)) 5)" § 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act does not
require exhaustion (5 U.S.C. § 704 (1982)).
72. J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY, 10 (1978). As Max Weber would have it, the
authority of any institution ultimately rests upon the popular belief of its legitimacy. Id.,
citing M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (T. Parsons ed.
1970).
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resorting to force, as evidenced by the federal government's use of
the military to quash a few "rebellions", e. g., the Whiskey Rebellion, the Civil War, and its twentieth century counterpart in 1956
after Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas.7 3 How then
can an institution, the legitimacy of which is questioned because
its very nature violates the separation of powers doctrine be accepted, obeyed and respected?
One commentator suggested the sense of "crisis" results from
"the failure of many Americans to appreciate the relevance of four
principal sources of legitimacy to the role that administrative
agencies play in the American government. 7 First, agencies occupy an important position in the governmental framework; second, the agencies embody significant elements of political accountability; third, the effectiveness of many agencies in meeting
statutory requirements; and fourth, for the most part, agency decision-making procedures are fair.7
The second half of this article will consider the controls the
three traditional branches of government place on the administrative process, as well as the limitations the Administrative Procedure Act requires the agencies to place on themselves. This is premised on a simple syllogistic argument: if a controllable
government entity is more readily accepted by the governed, and
acceptance equates to legitimacy, then proof of control should
yield legitimacy.

IV.

CONTROL OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

Where law ends, discretion begins, and the exercise of discretion may mean
either beneficence or tyranny, either justice or injustice, either reasonable6
ness or arbitrariness.

73. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). Brown is, of
course, the case overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 ( 1896) and the policy of "separate but equal," with its holding that the doctrine denied African - American children an
education equal to that received by white children.
When the Governor and Legislature of Arkansas refused to implement the desegregation
policy required by Brown on the grounds that State. officers have no duty to obey federal
court orders interpreting the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, stated "Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the 'supreme
Law of the Land.' " Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18. Thus, while it is true that the responsibility for
public education generally falls on the states, it is equally true that the undertaking must
comport with federal constitutional requirements. Id. at 19.
74. J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY, 11 (1978).
75. Id.
76. KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY, 3 (1969).
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According to one commentator, most instances of discretionary
justice exercised by agency administrators fall beyond the scope of
judicial review." It is this almost unbridled power which if not
controlled, can switch from discretion to tyranny. Examples of discretionary justice are commonplace: prosecutorial discretion of who
to or not to prosecute; agency discretion in determining which of
numerous violators the agency should sanction to best effectuate
policy;7 8 and the very simple but often very important decision of
who receives the benefits offered by the government. In an effort to
restrain some of the discretion exercised by agencies, each, of the
three traditional branches of government exerts its own area of expertise over the agency.
A.

Legislative

Prior to 1983, nearly 200 statutory provisions existed in various
enabling statutes which allowed Congress to have the final say in
an agency's determination, whether it involved agency adjudication
or rulemaking. 79 This device, known as the legislative veto, came
into being in 1929 when President Hoover requested authority to
reorganize the governmental structure.8 0 The legislative veto offered a solution to the problems arising from the delegation of
powers to handle national security and foreign affairs during the
second world war." During the 1970's, the veto permitted the
granting of broad powers to administrators who were entrusted
with settling complex issues which could not easily be resolved
within the framework of a tightly worded enabling statute."2 It
was, in essence, an indispensable political invention which allowed
the President and Congress to effect policy decisions and assure
the accountability of independent agencies, all the while preserving
Congressional control over lawmaking."3 With the decision in
I.N.S. v. Chada,84 the Supreme Court invalidated the legislative
veto for three reasons: one, it violated the separation of powers
77. Id. at 4.
78. FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244 (1967). (In the absence of an abuse
of agency discretion, the courts cannot overturn determinations which require the specialized judgment of the agency.)
79. 462 U.S. at 968.
80. I.N.S. v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 968 (1983) (Justice White, dissenting). See supra
note 6 for further discussion of Chada.
81. Id. at 969.
82. Id. at 970.
83. Id. at 972-73.
84. 462 U.S. 919. See supra note 7.
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doctrine by allowing the legislature to exercise an executive power;
two, it violated the principle of bi-cameralism (i.e., except for instances enumerated in the Constitution, all bills had to be
presented from both Houses); and, three, it violated the presentment clause (i.e., any bill passing both Houses had to be presented
to the Executive for signature before it became law). 5
With the loss of the legislative veto, how can Congress assure
accountability of independent and executive agencies? One
method, suggested by Kenneth Davis in his book Discretionary
Justice: A PreliminaryInquiry, is that Congress write the statutes
with greater specificity thereby eliminating much of the agency's
discretion. Discretionary power can suffer from being too broad or
too narrow; normally, the error is toward making discretion too
broad which leads to arbitrariness or inequality. 6 If the statute is
too narrow, one remedy is for the agency administering it to make
8 7
recommendations to the legislature for statutory amendment.
While such an approach (specificity in the enabling statute) is
theoretically the most favorable, and is certainly likely to meet
with the mandates of Justice Rehnquist's dissent in the "Cotton
Dust" Case, it is not the most practical approach. Consider the
time and effort put into the 1986 Internal Revenue Code. Consider
also that despite these efforts, volumes of Treasury Regulations
and Revenue Rulings will result as individuals question the meaning of each new statutory section. If each piece of legislation enacted by Congress had to reach the level of specificity of the Internal Revenue Code, lawmaking as such would come to a screeching
halt in a seemingly torpid system. Congress, and the public as well,
would find this intolerable. Consequently, Congress has within its
power several alternatives which vary from direct devices, such as:
explicit statutory override of an offending regulation, joint resolutions, and the limitation or removal of agency jurisdiction; to indirect methods, such as: committee vetoes, critical oversight hearings, and limitations on appropriations. 8 The power Congress
exerts over the agencies is becoming increasingly more political.
85. Id., at 959-67. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell would have limited the
reasons for invalidation in this case to the fact that Congress, by deciding to deport an alien,
was exercising judicial power. Id. at 965-67. This would have saved the legislative veto in
general by limiting the holding of the case to the narrowest issues.
86. KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY, 52 (1969).
87. Id. at 53.
88. Frederick M. Kaiser, Congressional Control of Executive Actions in the Aftermath of the Chada Decision, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 241 (1984).
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The theoretical argument that agencies have no accountability to
the public since they are manned by nonelected officials appears
insignificant when viewed realistically.
B. Judicial Review
If habeas corpus is the Great Writ, due process is the Great Clause.

9

"Most administrative law is judge-made law." 90 Since administrative law concerns the powers and procedures of administrative
agencies, including the law governing judicial review of agency actions, this area of law has "been one of the areas of special judicial
creativity."'91
One case has altered the balance between the agency and judicial authority over statutory interpretation. In Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,92 the Court held
that:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear; that is the end of the matter; for the court as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress. If, however, the court determines that Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply
impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the
absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction."

Thus, the Court has clearly indicated that the courts of appeal are
not to impose their interpretation of the statute on the agencies
absent an administrative interpretation.'
89. J. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE, 2 (1985).
90. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMIN. LAW TREATISE, §1:9 (2d ed. 1978).
91. Id.
92. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
93. Id. 842-43. This attitude is not new to the Court, although it has resurfaced in
recent years. The Court had originally stated similar language as early as 1947.
The scope of our review of an administrative order wherein a new principle is announced and applied is no different from that which pertains to ordinary administrative action. The wisdom of the principle adopted is not our concern. Our duty is at an
end when it becomes evident that the Commission's action is based upon substantial
evidence and is consistent with the authority granted by Congress.
S.E.C. v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 207 (1947) (citations omitted). See supra note 64 for a
discussion of Chenery.
94. Even in the absence of a state administrative interpretation it may be prudent for

a federal court to abstain from hearing a case if it is evident that the state agency entrusted
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Although the Vermont Yankee case may have put a stop, at
least temporarily, to judicial creativity with regard to rulemaking
procedures, and Chevron has halted the imposition of the courts'
interpretation of the regulatory statute on the agency, it is doubtful the Court will ever severely limit the scope of review with regard to adjudicatory procedures followed by agencies. This naturally follows from the distinction between rulemaking (legislation)
and adjudication. Whenever a government body acts to affect the
rights of an individual, whether property or liberty interests are
involved, the issue is raised to a constitutional level invoking either
fifth or fourteenth amendment protections of due process.9 5 Regulation or rulemaking, which is generally across the board line-drawing, in essence, is due process, 9 because the rule of conduct effects
all of a large group of people. Fundamentally, due process is fairness. "Procedural due process rules are meant to protect persons
not from the deprivation of life, liberty or property, but from the
'
mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty or property."97
It is no small coincidence that the "due process explosion" of the
1970's resulted from review of agency determinations. As the effects of both regulatory and benefactory agencies became more
pervasive, individuals began to question, not whether the agencies
could act as they did, but whether the act was taken properly. Necessity of the times and the complexity of the society demonstrated the need for the agencies to act, but the individuals effected wanted to make certain the act was as fair as possible. The
Court was willing to oblige by eliminating the distinction between
with regulating the subject matter at issue is presently considering the issue. See Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 312 (1943) (a federal court having jurisdiction, whether by diversity or
federal question, of a suit to enjoin enforcement of a state agency may, in its sound discretion, refuse such relief if to grant it would be prejudicial to the public interest). Such is
generally not an issue however, when the plaintiff raises a pre-emption issue. Kentucky
West Virginia Gas v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n, 791 F.2d 1111 (3d Cir. 1986)
(Abstention by district court is usually not appropriate where a federal plaintiff asserts a
pre-emption claim). Id. at 1117.
95. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). This case, which eliminated the "right
v. privilege" distinction involved the termination of welfare benefits by the New York City
Department of Social Services.
96. Provided the agency follows the procedures of § 553 of the A.P.A. regarding formal
rulemaking.
97. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978). (It was a violation of due process to
suspend high school students without affording them an opportunity to answer the charges,
even if the suspensions were justified.)
98. The "due process explosion" referred to is that resulting from the elimination of
the "right v. privilege" argument in Goldberg v. Kelly. This should not be confused with the
changes in constitutional criminal procedure developed during the Warren Court.
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rights and privileges. That may seem simplistic, yet the elimination of the distinction opened up the rights of due process to those
previously denied a hearing.
For example, in 1956, the security officer of the Naval Gun Factory in Washington, D.C. revoked the security pass of a cafeteria
worker without a hearing or any indication of a reasons for the
revocation. 9 The Supreme Court denied the individual's due process claim stating that such government employment was "a mere
privilege subject to the Executive's plenary power . . . [therefore]
notice and hearing are not constitutionally required." 10 0 Compare
that holding with Goldberg eleven years later, where the Court determined that the fourteenth amendment procedural protections
apply to liberty and property interests and recognized that the
property interests are determined by whether or not the individual
has a legitimate claim of entitlement to the interest.' °1
An attempt was made to curtail the "explosion" in 1974 by limiting due process to the procedures supplied in the enabling statute granting the benefit. The "bitter with the sweet" approach, announced by Justice Rehnquist in Arnett v. Kennedy, °2 would limit
the scope of the procedural protection of a statutorily granted benefit, whether it be employment or public assistance, to the proce99. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 887-88 (1961).
100. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). The
Court reasoned that "[AIll that was denied her was the opportunity to work at one isolated
and specific military installation." Id. at 896.
101. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 254, 261-62 (1970). See Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). The case involved a college teacher who was not rehired after the
expiration of his one-year contract. Roth claimed the Board refused to rehire him due to his
outspokenness against the Vietnam War. The Board contended that it did not have to give
Roth a hearing to discuss the issue since the contract had expired and he was not entitled to
a hearing. The Supreme Court agreed, thereby defining the scope of property interests:
[T]o have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an
abstrct need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it.
He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are
created and their dimensions defined by existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law.
408 U.S. at 577. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas stated:
[Wihen a violation of the First Amendment rights is alleged, the reasons for dismissal
or nonrenewal of an employment contract must be examined to see if the reasons
given are only a cloak for activity or attitudes protected by the Constitution.
408 U.S. at 582. Thus, he would have granted a hearing because of the chilling effect the
nonrenewal would have on constitutionally protected speech. Id. at 585-87.
102. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
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dures outlined in the statute authorizing agency action."' 3 This approach was never accepted by a majority of the Court which
refused to combine substance with procedure as Justice Rehnquist's approach would require. As Justice Powell put it in his concurring opinion in Arnett, "the right to due process is conferred
not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee."' 10 "
The courts have also attempted to provide some check on the
discretion exercised at the informal level, that is, agency guidelines
or standards which do not have the force of law but which effect
the method by which the agency carries out legislative policy. In
Morton v. Ruiz, 0 5 the Supreme Court held that the agency must
let the standard be generally known to the public to assure its consistent application, and, the agency interpretation must conform to
the legislative purpose, in order to be given deference by the
courts.' 0 6
The need to maintain the fairness of daily, ordinary agency decisions is a matter of great concern for both the legislators creating
the benefit and the recipients of the benefit. Cases such as Ruiz
began to provide the framework to control discretionary justice.
C.

Executive Control

Most of the executive's control of the administrative state can be
seen as politics in action. This includes the powers of appointment
103. Id. In Arnett, a federal civil servant was dismissed for making allegedly defamatory comments about some of his superior. He was informed of his right to answer the
charges but chose to bring suit for declaratory and injunctive relief since the informal hearing would be held by the superior allegedly defamed. A plurality of the Court, Justice Rehnquist opining, concluded that where a statute provides that a federal employee can be dismissed only for cause and further conditions the grant of protection on the use of the
procedures outlined in the statute, the litigant is required to use only those procedures. 416
U.S. at 153-54.
Justice Powell, writing a concurring opinion, determined that the statute gave the employee a property interest in employment which could only be terminated by constitutionally acceptable procedures. 416 U.S. at 164-71. Justice Powell then analyzed the procedures
and determined they comported with due process. Id. at 171. His rationale was later
adopted by the majority of the Court. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) discussed at note 134 infra.
104. Arnett, 416 U.S. at 167. See also note 98 supra.
105. 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
106. Id.. Plaintiffs, Papago Indians, were denied benefits by the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") based on an unplublished internal policy which denied benefits to Indians not
living on the reservation. The Court voided the BIA policy on the basis that failure of the
Secretary of the Interior to publish the policy and treat it as a legislative rule deprived the
policy of effect. Additionally, the Court found that the BIA internal policy was contrary to
Congressional intent since Congress never distinguished between the Indians living on and
those living near the reservation. 415 U.S. at 237.
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and removal from office of top administrators, direction of policy
within statutory boundaries, and organization or reorganization of
agency power. Some of the executive's control over administrative
agencies has been weakened as Congress exercises more control
over the Executive. Perhaps the single most effective control the
executive retains over the administrative state is the power of the
purse. In 1921, the Budget and Accounting Act established the Bureau of the Budget which required that all requests for appropriations be channelled through the Bureau to Congress. In 1970, this
10 7
Bureau became known as the Office of Management and Budget.
In this manner, presidential control over finances can be used to
control policy, thereby resulting in administrative repeal of legislative action through the funding process.108
A significant attempt was made in 1985 to control the budget
deficit through the use of the Office of Budget Management with
the passage of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act). 0 9 Section 251 of
the Act would have permitted the Comptroller General to recommend to the President reductions in spending and appropriations. "' The section was found to be unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine in Synar v. United
States."' The Court reasoned that since the Comptroller General
exercised powers executive in nature, yet was subject to removal
only by Congress itself, this permitted Congress to retain control
over an executive officer, an action in violation of the theory of
separation of powers." 2 In view of the fact that section 274(f), or
the "fallback" provision of the Gramm-Rudman Act is still valid
legislation, 3 deficit reduction legislation remains a viable control
over the administrative state.
D. Administrative Procedure Act
The outstanding single development in administrative law and in the ad-

107. W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 139 (1979).
108. Id.
109. Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 200, 99 Stat. 1038 (1985).
110. 80 Stat. 1063 (1985).
111. 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1388 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd sub nom., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714 (1986).
112. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. at 736. "[Tlhe powers vested in the Comptroller General under section 251 violate the command of the Constitution that Congress play no direct
role in the execution of the laws." Id.
113. Id. at 735.
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ministrative agencies of the last half-century
ment of the Administrative Procedure Act.1""

511
is the genesis and enact-

The Administrative Procedure Act appears in Title V, of the
United States Code.' 15 The two most important chapters of the
Act, for the purpose of this article, are Chapter 5 - Administrative
Procedure, and Chapter 7 - Judicial Review.
Section 553 (Rulemaking) requires an agency to publish general
notice of a proposed rule within the Federal Register.11 6 After notice, the agency is to allow interested persons an opportunity to
participate in the rulemaking by submitting written data, views, or
arguments relevant to the matter.1 7 A hearing may be instituted,
but is not mandatory and may be omitted if the agency determines
the hearing to be is unnecessary or contrary to the public good. 1 8
After consideration, publication of the final substantive rule is
made at least 30 days before the effective date." 9 The aforementioned procedures are sometimes referred to as procedures for formal rulemaking. 2 ° A variation known as "notice and comment" exists for informal rulemaking. Totally exempt from the procedures
are policy statements and interpretive rules. 1 '
The sections describing the procedures for agency adjudication
(§§ 554-557), while instrumental in that they require the existence
of framework for review within the administrative system, are
equally as important as the grant of right of judicial review encompassed in section 702, which provides: "A person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved
by agency action within the meaning of the relevant [enabling]
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.'" 2
The statutory grant of standing found in section 702 is controlled by the basic notion found in Article III that there must be a
live case or controversy.' 2 3 Unless the plaintiff has a direct per114. J.S. Williams, Fifty Years of the Law of the Federal Administrative Agencies And Beyond, 29 FED. B.J. 267 (1970).

115. 5 U.S.C. § 551 et. seq. (1982).
116. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
117. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) and § 556 (1982).
118. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (1982).
119. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1982).
120. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982).
121. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 553, et seq (1982).
122. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
123. Article III of the United States Constitution proves in pertinent part: "The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitutuion, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made ...
to Controversies to which the United
States shall be a party;-to Controversies between two or more states.... U.S. CONST. art.
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sonal interest and can show causation between the injury and the
remedy requested, there is no case or controversy. 24 No Court can
act as a superior over the other branches of the government, but
must instead perform its constitutional function of deciding an actual case before the court.'25
The exceptions to the broad grant of power include statutory
preclusion of judicial review and instances where agency action is
committed to the discretion of the agency. 2 A third, judicially
created, exception exists where the case calls for a determination
outside the judicial domain.' 27
Since its passage in 1946, the Administrative Procedure Act,' 28
has not been radically changed, with the possible exception of the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) encompassed in Section
552.129 Previous to the enactment of the FOIA, rules and organizational material had to be published in the Federal Register. The
FOIA further required agencies to index and make available to the
public all final opinions and orders in adjudacatory cases, statements of policy and interpretation, and staff manuals and instructions that affect an individual.'"s "Failure to comply with these
• ..requirements deprives the agency of its ability to rely on these
possible sources of law, absent actual notice of them to the affected
party."'' Particularly important is the FOIA requirement that information must be made available to any person, without restriction that it be a party involved in proceedings with the agency. 2
III § 2.
124. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, reh. denied, 468 U.S. 1250 (1984). Plaintiffs, parents of African American children, brought a class action against the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") alleging that the IRS had failed to adopt sufficient standards to fulfill the IRS'
obligation under 26 U.S.C. §§ 501(a) and (c)(3) to deny exempt status to schools which
racially discirminate. The Court found that the parents lacked standing. In order to have
standing, a plaintiff must show a judicially cognizable injury fairly traceable to the unlawful
conduct of the defendant. There is an additional element of redressability, i.e., that the
relief requested will redress the violation of the law alleged. Allen, 468 U.S. at 753, n.19.
125. B. Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1984, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 148-50
(1985).
126. 5. U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) & (2) (1982).
127. Curran v. Laird, 420 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1969). There exist "issues [which] call for
determinations that lie outside sound judicial domain in terms of aptitude, facilities, and
responsibility." Id. at 129. This is particularly true in areas of foreign affairs.
128. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237, repealed and reenacted Pub. L. No.
89-554, 80 Stat. 381 now codified as 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1982).
129. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1982).
130. W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 580 (1979).
131. Id.
132. The exceptions to the Freedom of Information Act are listed in § 552(b) and
include, but are not limited to, matters of national security, trade secrets, inter-agency
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The decision in Morton v. Ruiz was judicial vindication of the
FOIA.
V.

CONCLUSION

This author has spent considerable time expounding the virtues
and decrying the faults of the present American administrative
state, yet all the verbiage will not change the fact that it exists, it
has its purpose, and it generally works. That statement indicates a
"utilitarian" approach to the acceptance of laws and government,
but the author is not as pessimistic as it would first appear. The
administrative leviathan is not the only governmental body which
exists within the American society. The three more traditional
branches still retain an effective control over agencies through
their various functions. Most notable are the legislature's power to
create and provide standards for the agency in the enabling statutes, the executive's management of the budget, and the judiciary's
right of review. While the traditional branches can require fair and
reasonable procedures within the sphere of formal administrative
activities, it is the daily, ordinary, informal actions which effect numerous individuals which appear to be beyond traditional control.
Significantly, in this regard to controlling the informal actions,
an immense potential exists within the Administrative Procedure
Act, especially the Freedom of Information Act. By refusing to give
deference to statements of general policy unless the agency has
published those standards, the courts and the legislature have
come that much closer to achieving definiteness and consistency in
agency determinations. Consequently, there is less of a field of discretion to be exercised in that area where the courts are limited in
1 33
their standard of review to an "abuse of discretion.'

Understandably, it appears that judicial review may be the best
control over the administrative system since it was the inability of
the legislature to handle detailed regulation and provision of assismemorandum and personnel files.
133. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). See also Citizen's to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402 (1971). Volpe involved a group of citizens in Memphis, Tennessee who were
concerned that the Secretary of Transportation would authorize the use of federal highway
funds to put a six lane highway through a public park. The relevant statutes, § 4(f) of the
Department of Transportation Act of 1966 and § 138 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of
1968 permitted the construction of highways through park land only if there is not another
feasible and prudent route. The Court found that the record was insufficient to determine if
the Secretary had acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner, abused his discretion or otherwise acted not in accordance with the law. The Court was applying the standard found in §
706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 401 U.S. at 416.
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tance benefits which originally resulted in the creation of the agencies. Cases such as Morton v. Ruiz, Goldberg, and Mathews v. Eldridge,3 indicate that the Supreme Court is willing to issue
guidance in the administrative law area. Only Ruiz addressed an
issue premised on APA foundations, the other two advanced a
more traditional constitutional question. However, the potential
exists for more issues to be advanced using the APA approach as
their basis. As judges and lawyers accept the Administrative Procedure Act as a valid guideline for agency activity, the administra
tive state may lose some of its leviathan-ish characteristics and
take on more of an appearance of a legitimate fourth branch of
government.

134. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) was referred to by C. Schwartz in Administrative Law Cases During 1984 as the "cost-benefit analysis of the due process issue."
Mathews involved a determination of whether the procedures followed by the Social Security Administation ("SSA") when awarding disability benefits passed constitutional muster. Based on Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Court concluded that the recipient
has a property interest in receiving benefits thereby triggering the due process protections.
The next inquiry was: how much process is due. The procedures used by the SSA resulted in
the termination of benefits before the hearing. In determining that a post-termination hearing was sufficient to protect the recipient, Justice Powell announced the three factor test
commonly referred to as the cost-benefit analysis test:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirment would entail.
424 U.S. at 335.

